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Welfare and active labour market 
policies in the UK: the coalition 
government approach
Anne Daguerre and David Etherington
Introduction
From the mid-1980s onwards, the UK social security system has 
become increasingly residual in nature, with the language of contracts 
pervading most areas of welfare, as evidenced by the creation of 
Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) in 1995/96. By the mid-1990s, a cross-
party consensus had emerged concerning the need to move away 
from a passive welfare system based on entitlement to unemployment 
benefits towards an active welfare model based on responsibilities, 
encapsulated in the notion of the moral obligations of citizenship. 
There has been a marked shift away from an approach based upon 
the duty of the state to support its citizens towards one concerned 
with the enforcement of a citizen’s obligation to participate in the 
labour market (Harris, 2010). Under the new welfare contractualism 
(White, 2000; Freedland and King, 2003; Griggs and Bennett, 2009), 
social rights can be understood as consisting of rights to reasonable 
access to benefits, rather than unconditional rights to welfare benefits 
as such. This new welfare contractualism has become a strong area of 
bipartisan consensus, not least because New Labour under Tony Blair 
had promoted a ‘work-first’ approach based on the active monitoring 
of claimants. Work over welfare (Haskins, 2006), or how to enable the 
non-working poor to enter or re-enter the world of paid employment, 
has been at the heart of welfare reform changes over the past three 
decades. Here, we can identify two di!erent views of the causes and 
cures for welfare dependency of the issue, which gave rise to di!erent 
sets of policy prescriptions in the 1980s and 1990s:
• Behavioural deficiencies – economic inactivity, underemployment 
and long-term unemployment (all di!erent phenomena in labour 
market terms) are the result of a lack of work ethic and/discipline 
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on the part of the non-working poor. From this perspective, entry-
level jobs are available and welfare claimants need a combination 
of hassle and help to take them up. The issue of unemployment is 
explained in terms of behavioural deficiencies. The portrayal of the 
non-working poor as lacking the drive and motivation to take up 
available jobs means that there is an emphasis on churning people 
into low-paid jobs or maintaining them in a perpetual state of job-
readiness (Peck, 2001, p 12). The policy instruments deployed for 
getting people into jobs rely on a mix of sticks (in the form of benefit 
sanctions in case of non-compliance with work-related activities, 
time-limited benefits, close monitoring of claimants to ensure that 
they comply with the requirements and incentive reinforcement) and 
carrots (such as in-work credits or income disregards, or transitional 
and or passport benefits) [[changes to sentence ok?]].
• Human capital – while work-first measures rely on rapid attachment 
to the labour force, with an emphasis on stick and carrots and 
with strong disciplinarian and authoritarian tendencies, human 
capital approaches insist on the importance of individual barriers 
to employment, such as a lack of professional skills. From this 
perspective, there is a fierce competition for jobs that places people 
who lack skills at a severe disadvantage, not simply because they find 
it increasingly di"cult to access entry-level jobs, but also because 
they can only take up unstable, low-paid employment, leading to 
a pattern of ‘labour market churning’, whereby people cycle back 
and forth between low-paid, low-skilled employment and welfare 
benefits. The lack of relevant skills in a highly selective labour market 
is seen as the primary cause of long-term unemployment and, 
increasingly, the widespread experience of economic marginality. 
There is an emphasis on upskilling the labour force (Bonoli, 2012) 
by providing on-the-job training, basic skills sets (including literary 
and numeracy) or postgraduate diplomas.
Between 1997 and 2010, successive Labour administrations had pledged 
to rebuild the welfare state along the logic of mutual obligations on 
the part of the state and its citizens, with a corresponding emphasis 
on paid work as the best way to combat poverty. There was not much 
emphasis on skills, however; instead, Labour endeavoured to make 
work pay through the introduction of the National Minimum Wage 
and in-work tax credits, which became more generous in 2003.
The Labour governments endorsed a ‘workfarist’ approach, and 
gradually extended work-search requirements to categories of 
the working-age population who had in the past been exempted 
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from such requirements – essentially lone parents and people with 
health conditions. The expansion was achieved in stages through 
the implementation of various New Deals (Daguerre, 2007; Driver, 
2009). The Welfare Reform Act 2009 realised the vision of the Gregg 
(2008) report, according to which conditionality (the principle that 
entitlement to benefits should be dependent on satisfying certain 
conditions) should be extended to the vast majority of the working-age 
population so that virtually no one may claim benefits without taking 
active steps to address their barriers to work. The aim was to establish 
a personalised conditionality regime tailored to the individual needs 
of jobseekers regardless of administrative classification. The legislation 
was couched in a strong personal responsibility language, with the key 
notion that there was a need for a much clearer sanction regime for 
those who failed to attend an interview or failed to sign on without 
a good reason (Daguerre and Etherington, 2014).
To a large extent, welfare reforms post-2010 have strengthened the 
dominant work-first logic, where the focus is on strict job search, the 
key element of which is to increase labour supply. This emphasis on 
the obligation to take up work as a condition of receiving benefits was 
laid out by the future Prime Minister David Cameron when describing 
the Conservative welfare contract:
We’re going to change the whole way welfare is done in 
this country so everyone takes responsibility and plays their 
part. This is our new welfare contract: do the right thing and 
we will back you all the way. But fail to take responsibility 
– and the free ride is over. (Cameron, 2010)
The welfare-to-work system was designed to condition and coerce 
benefit claimants into jobs through tougher and more widespread 
benefit sanctions for those who are closest to the labour market 
(JSA claimants). This was the policy announced by the Conservative 
manifesto in 2010. The manifesto stipulated that:
Anyone on Jobseeker’s Allowance who refuses to join the 
Work Programme will lose the right to claim out-of-work 
benefits until they do, while people who refuse to accept 
reasonable job o!ers could forfeit their benefits for up to 
three years. (Conservative Party, 2010, p 15)
This chapter seeks to characterise the policies of the Conservative-led 
coalition government between 2010 and 2015. The chapter is divided 
page 205
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
Welfare and active labour market policies in the UK
206
The coalition government and social policy
into three sections. First, we briefly summarise the main reforms to the 
tax and benefit systems (cuts to tax credits, a tougher conditionality 
regime and the introduction of Universal Credit) (see also Chapter 
Eight). We also examine the characteristics of work-for-your-benefit 
schemes, which represent workfare in the strictest sense of the word 
since welfare claimants have to work for their benefits. Second, we 
argue that the coalition’s welfare-to-work agenda was, to a large 
extent, dominated by a traditional Conservative discourse based on the 
stigmatisation of welfare dependency on moral and economic grounds. 
Participation in paid work was portrayed as a moral duty of citizenship 
(Larkin, 2014), with social assistance being concentrated on the most 
‘vulnerable’ and ‘deserving’ individuals. Third, we conclude that the 
Liberal Democrats did exert a moderating influence in some areas of 
social policy, mainly in relation to welfare policies for young people 
and cuts to tax credits.
The reforms
As noted by Hills (2015), the coalition government agreement (Cabinet 
O"ce, 2010) was relatively vague and succinct in relation to welfare 
and employment policies. However, three main principles underpinned 
the new government’s approach. First, the tax and benefit system 
should positively encourage participation in paid work, which meant 
that out-of-work benefits should be kept at a bare minimum and even 
reduced; this justified both the introduction of in-work conditionality 
through Universal Credit and the benefit cap. Indeed, a major change 
compared with New Labour’s policies was the cuts to tax credits that 
had subsidised low-paid workers since the 2000s. Second, taxpayers’ 
money was to be spent wisely on both the most deserving and the most 
vulnerable; in particular, the threat of benefit sanctions in the form 
of cuts to out-of-work benefits was geared to promote behavioural 
change on the part of benefit claimants so that they would fulfil their 
part of the bargain, that is, engage in paid work whenever possible. 
Of course, the idea that the benefit system could be used to steer 
behavioural change and instil a work ethic among welfare recipients 
had also been a central tenet of New Labour policies, but the main 
di!erence between the approaches of Labour and the coalition was that 
the latter put a much greater emphasis on sticks (financial sanctions 
in case of non-compliance with work requirements), as opposed to 
carrots, both in terms of rhetoric (as illustrated by the previous quote 
from David Cameron) and in actual policies. Third, the coalition 
government was committed to reducing the role and the size of the 
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state through the generalisation of the contracting out of employment 
and training services to private providers (elements of privatisation and 
contracting out had already been introduced by New Labour under 
the Flexible New Deal, but the Work Programme (WP) was much 
more ambitious in this respect). We will review the main changes to 
the benefit system with a particular emphasis on benefit sanctions (as 
encapsulated by the Welfare Reform Act 2012), as well as the expansion 
of work-for-your-benefit schemes (see also Chapter Eight).
The coalition government’s tax and benefit policies were spelled out 
in the 2010 Green Paper, 21st century welfare, and the White Paper, 
Universal Credit: welfare that works (DWP, 2010a, 2010b). The most 
radical reform consisted of the unification of several means-tested 
benefits (Income Support [IS], Employment and Support Allowance 
[ESA], JSA and Housing Benefit) and tax credits (Working Tax Credit 
and Housing Benefit [[sense? Child Tax Credit?]]) in order to 
simplify a complex and confusing system and ensure that work always 
pays through the introduction of Universal Credit (Patrick, 2014, p 
61). In this respect, the coalition were following the 1997–2010 Labour 
administrations’ attempts to simplify the welfare system, when Labour 
established the Benefit Simplification Unit in 2006 (Harris, 2013, pp 
18–19). The model for in-work conditionality had been introduced 
by the Centre for Social Justice (CSJ), and was explained at length in 
the document Dynamic benefits (CSJ, 2009). Universal Credit involves 
in-work conditionality, with the requirement for claimants to attain 
an ‘earnings threshold’ set at the level of e!ort that it is reasonable 
for an individual to undertake. Working-age adults are subject to 
conditionality until they work full-time (35 hours) at the National 
Minimum Wage. If someone is earning below the conditionality cut-o! 
point, they will be expected to ‘look for work, more work or better-
paid work’. Exceptions to this are those with caring responsibilities 
and those with health conditions (Tarr and Finn, 2012). Universal 
Credit is being introduced in stages, starting with the most simple cases 
(single unemployed claimants), and followed by more complex cases, 
essentially couples and families. The trials and delays associated with 
Universal Credit are beyond the scope of this chapter, but the scheme 
has su!ered several setbacks due to the introduction of a number of 
ambitious reforms at a time of spending cuts, thus a!ecting the capacity 
of the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) to carry out reforms 
within rigid time frames (National Audit O"ce, 2015).
Other changes in the tax and benefit system included the introduction 
of a cap of £26,000 per year in the total amount of benefits that 
working-age people and their families can receive (excluding those 
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on certain disability benefits or working enough hours to qualify for 
Working Tax Credit). Crucially, tax credits, a central component of 
making work pay under New Labour, were also made less generous 
through various means, notably, the abolition of the ‘baby element’ 
of Child Tax Credit (Hill, 2015, pp 16–17), The decisions to freeze 
major out-of-work benefits, to cut and freeze tax credits, and to restrict 
access to disability benefits represent fundamental, cumulative changes 
to the tax and benefit system.
The coalition also built upon previous Labour policies by extending 
work-search requirements to other groups of benefit claimants who 
had been subjected in the past to moderate work-search requirements, 
namely, single parents on IS and people with health conditions who 
had been either on Incapacity Benefit (IB) or, in some cases, IS on 
the grounds of disability.
IB is traditionally determined within a framework of rules and 
without a specific limit on budgets. Two sets of rules determine the 
eligibility: a test of incapacity to work and an assessment of benefit 
eligibility, based either on national insurance contributions or on means 
testing. The Work Capability Assessment (WCA) devised in 2007/08 
led to a reduction in the range of conditions that enabled people to 
qualify for IB. It essentially restricted eligibility criteria for IB receipt 
and introduced a kind of employability test (Gulland, 2013, pp 71–3). 
Claimants can be placed in the Work Related Activity Group (WRAG) 
if they are unwell but may still be able to do some work. Claimants are 
expected to attend a work-focused interview and training, and will 
have regular reassessments to decide if they should claim JSA instead 
of ESA. Once placed in the Support Group, claimants do not have to 
attend work-focused interviews and training unless they would like 
to. The coalition government wanted to accelerate the migration of 
IB claimants onto ESA, and initially aimed to move 1.5 million IB 
claimants onto ESA between 2010 and 2014 (Patrick, 2014, p 60). 
They were, however, unable to meet this ambitious target, in part, 
because a higher than expected volume of IB claimants were found 
incapable of some form of work-related activity, and also because the 
screening process carried out by the private company ATOS resulted 
in a large number of appeals from claimants who had been found fit for 
work: 40% of new claimants found fit for work appealed, with almost 
40% of those appeals being successful (Hood and Phillips, 2015, p 25).
The coalition government also subjected more lone parents to the 
requirements of JSA by moving them o! IS. The reform, known as the 
Lone Parent Obligation (LPO), started in 2008 under Labour, and as a 
result, lone parents whose youngest child was aged 12 were subjected 
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to a work-search requirement. The age condition was reduced to 10 
from October 2009, to seven from October 2010 and to five from 
May 2012 (Hood and Phillips, 2015, p 28).
The new policy framework for benefit sanctions was consolidated in 
the Welfare Reform Act 2012 and subsequent regulations. Although 
the drive towards the adoption of a more stringent sanctions regime 
had started well before 2010, there was a significant qualitative and 
quantitative di!erence between the benefit sanction regime prior to 
2010 and the policy framework post-2012. The length of sanction 
periods was extended at the end of 2012, with the minimum sanction 
period being increased from one week to four weeks and the maximum 
from 26 weeks to three years. Higher-level sanctions represent a ‘very 
much more stringent sanctions regime than those previously applicable’ 
(Wood et al, 2013 [[citation not referenced, but see 2015. Please 
add/correct]], p 93). The new sanctions were applied to JSA claimants 
from October 2012.
In practice, the coalition clearly delivered on its promise to implement 
a tougher sanctions regime, with JSA sanctions reflected as a proportion 
of claimants after reconsiderations and appeals having stabilised at 5.5% 
and 6% of claimants per month, compared to an average of 2.2% of 
claimants between 2000 and 2006. There was an upward trend in JSA 
sanctions between 2007 and 2008, from 2.2% to 3.5%, followed by 
a sharp decline with the start of the intense economic recession. JSA 
sanctions rates then increased from 2.2% in April 2010 to 4.3% in 
December 2010, which corresponded to the increased use of sanctions 
once the coalition government took o"ce. This was then followed by 
a sharp decline in JSA sanctions in 2011, when WP providers become 
responsible for monitoring JSA claimants. However, from 2011, and 
especially as a result of the implementation of the new sanctions regime 
under the Welfare Reform Act 2012, JSA sanctions increased from a 
low of 3.5% in April 2012 to 5.8% in December 2013, and then fell 
slightly to 5.4% in December 2014 (Webster, 2014).
Another policy change was the widespread expansion of work-for-
your-benefit schemes, mainly the Jobseeker’s Allowance (Mandatory 
Work Activity Scheme) Regulations (SI 2011/688), the Jobseekers 
Allowance (Employment, Skills and Enterprise) Regulations 2011 
(SI 2011/917) (known as ESE), which replaced the Jobseekers 
Allowance (Work for Your Benefit Pilot Scheme) Regulations 2010 (SI 
2010/1222) introduced as part of the Welfare Reform Act 2009. The 
2011 Regulations were made in terms of section 17 of the Jobseeker’s 
Act 1995. The ESE scheme initially covered four initiatives: (1) Skills 
Conditionality was aimed at improving the take-up of help and support 
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for those claimants with an identified skills need – Jobcentre Plus was 
to refer claimants to a skills training provider; (2) Service Academies 
aimed to support jobseekers who were close to the labour market but 
who would benefit from participating in pre-employment training 
and work experience leading to a guaranteed interview to help them 
move into sustained employment; (3) the New Enterprise Allowance 
aimed to promote self-employment under the guidance of a business 
mentor, providing access to a weekly financial allowance and business 
start-up loan finance; and (4) the WP provided back-to-work support 
for a wide range of claimants, including JSA, ESA, IB and IS claimants. 
The other work-for-your-benefit scheme was the Mandatory Work 
Activity Regulation. Its purpose, as explained by the Explanatory Notes 
to the Mandatory Work Activity Regulations 2011, was:
to target the small number of customers who do enough to 
meet the conditions of their claim while at the same time 
continually failing to demonstrate the focus and discipline 
that is a key requirement of finding, securing and retaining 
employment. [[ref?]]
The language of the Explanatory Notes made it clear that there were 
a minority of JSA claimants who failed to engage with employers, and 
who did not have the work ethic or the discipline that was required 
to find, secure and retain employment.
Under the WP, private providers could decide to place people in 
work-related activities such as work experience placements. The WP 
is, in most cases, a mandatory programme: individuals aged 18–24 are 
referred to the WP after the nine-month point of their claim, while 
those aged 25 and over are placed on to the WP after claiming JSA 
for 12 months. The WP was emblematic of the governmental strategy 
of opening up the public sector to the market. Prime contractors 
(generally from the private sector) were appointed to deliver in localities 
(contract areas) on the basis of plans and strategies that were generally 
negotiated directly between the contractor and the DWP. The WP 
extended the contracting model and the role of private providers in 
the delivery of previous welfare-to-work programmes (Crighton et 
al, 2009). Providers were funded on a ‘payments by results basis’, 
structured in relation to initial attachment to the programme, job 
outcomes and job sustainability, with additional payments made for 
higher-performing contractors.
The other work-for-your-benefit scheme was the Work Experience 
Scheme, which is targeted at 18–24 year olds with little or no 
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experience of work. Young people can participate in the scheme after 
they have been claiming JSA for three months, but before they join 
the WP. Work Experience Schemes started in January 2011, and entry 
was voluntary but, as with the other work-for-your-benefit schemes, 
participation became compulsory after the individual began his/her 
placement. Table 9.1 provides a summary of the main work-for-your-
benefit schemes under the coalition government.
Work experience represented the single most important workfare 
scheme under the coalition, with 300,290 placements between January 
2011 and November 2014 (Dar, 2015). Work Experience Schemes, 
which were originally mandatory, became completely voluntary at the 
end of February 2012 following negative media coverage and employers 
dropping out of the scheme. As a result, Work Experience Schemes no 
longer qualify as workfare. Work-for-your-benefit schemes have been 
subjected to intense scrutiny in the courts, as shown by the number 
of legal challenges surrounding the work-for-your-benefit regulations 
(Larkin, 2013; see also Daguerre and Etherington, 2014).
Table 9.1: Main work-for-your-benefit schemes
Title Eligibility Length of 
placement
Mandatory or 
voluntary?
Work experience Young people 
on JSA for three 
months, no work 
experience
Up to 8 weeks Voluntary, originally 
risk of sanction if 
leaving. Became 
voluntary after 
February 2012
Sector-based work 
academy
Any age on JSA Up to 6 weeks Deciding whether or 
not to take part is 
voluntary but once 
placement starts, 
participation is 
mandatory
Work Programme 
(if referred to work 
experience)
Participant in Work 
Programme
Up to 4 weeks Mandatory
Mandatory Work 
Activity
Any age on JSA Up to 4 weeks Mandatory
Help to Work (post 
Work Programme 
provision)
JSA claimants who 
complete 104 
weeks on the Work 
Programme
Placement of 30 
hours a week for up 
to 26 weeks
Mandatory
Source: CESI ‘Government work experience schemes, what are the differences?’ (available at: http://www.
cesi.org.uk/keypolicy/government-work-experience-schemes-what-are-differences).
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The Conservative-led coalition government’s approach
How can we characterise the coalition government’s policies, and to 
what extent did they di!er from what might have emerged from a 
traditional Conservative majority government? To what extent, if any, 
did the Liberal Democrats exercise a moderating influence? In general, 
Conservative ministers took the lead on welfare reform within the 
DWP (see also Chapter Eight). Indeed, a division of labour occurred 
between the Conservatives and the Liberal democrats, with Iain 
Duncan Smith, as Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, and his 
personal advisers (notably, Philippa Stroud, from the CSJ), taking the 
lead on welfare and employment, and Steve Webb, a Liberal Democrat, 
in charge of pension reform.
In general, as indicated by Bochel and Powell in Chapter One of 
this volume, the coalition government’s approach to welfare reform 
was characterised by a New Right philosophy, with a strong emphasis 
on the responsibilities of citizenship (see Powell, 1999). Indeed, the 
focus was on the obligation to take up paid employment as a condition 
of citizenship. In fact, the goal of welfare reform under the coalition 
government was to produce self-reliant, autonomous citizens, whose 
dependency on the public purse should be reduced to a minimum. 
To help achieve this, the coalition believed that benefit levels should 
be kept at a low level, as evidenced by cuts to tax credits and the 
introduction of the benefit cap. Although the coalition espoused the 
logic of making work pay promoted by New Labour, its main policy 
instrument to promote participation in the labour market was sticks 
instead of carrots. In line with the goal of reducing welfare spending 
and ultimately the size of the state, the coalition first and foremost 
used negative financial incentives in the form of benefits sanctions and 
low benefit levels to encourage people to either stay o! benefits or to 
leave cash assistance.
The rhetoric of personal responsibility was one of the most prevalent 
principles underpinning the Welfare Reform Act 2012, especially 
through the claimant commitment. According to the Welfare Reform 
Act 2012, the claimant commitment ‘is a record of a claimant’s 
responsibilities in relation to an award of universal credit’, and ‘is to be 
in such form as the Secretary of State thinks fit’. In general, the claimant 
commitment includes an expectation that claimants will comply with 
a 35-hour work-search rule, although the DWP may agree a reduced 
time if claimants have impairments or caring disabilities. The claimant 
commitment was part of the ‘cultural transformation’ introduced by 
Universal Credit, whereby jobseekers ‘will have to account more clearly 
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for their e!orts to find work and will be given a weekly timetable of 
tasks to complete’ (DWP, 2013).
With reference to the claimant commitment, Iain Duncan Smith 
declared:
Through the ‘claimant commitment’, which deliberately 
mirrors a contract of employment, we are making this 
deal unequivocal. Those in work have obligations to their 
employer; so too claimants a responsibility to the taxpayer: 
in return for support, and where they are able, they must 
do their bit to find work. (Duncan Smith, 2014)
The good citizen is viewed as first and foremost economically self-
reliant. From this perspective, there is no entitlement to public 
assistance.
In terms of the mixed economy of welfare, the coalition opened up 
the welfare-to-work market to contracted-out providers; indeed, the 
WP e!ectively privatised training and employment services. Central 
to this approach was the view that public service provision should be 
kept at a low level.
One of the most influential intellectual inputs to government 
thinking was the work conducted by the CSJ, the think tank founded 
in 2004 by Iain Duncan Smith. The CSJ was commissioned in 2006 
by David Cameron to examine the causes of poverty in the UK. The 
report Breakdown Britain (CSJ, 2006) was hailed as evidence-based and 
identified five ‘pathways to poverty’ (see also Chapter Twelve): family 
breakdown, educational failure, economic dependence, indebtedness 
and addiction. This document is interesting because it set out a 
‘modern’ Conservative vision, which drew on classic authors and 
political Conservative political figures such as Adam Smith (including 
in relation to notions of relative poverty), Disraeli and Churchill, while 
at the same time paying tribute to the work of Guardian columnist Polly 
Toynbee (2003), the Child Poverty Action Group and the academic 
John Hills’s report on economic inequality (Hills et al, 2010). However, 
the document primarily gave a contemporary twist to the notion of an 
underclass culture based on drug and alcohol addiction, the breakdown 
of marriage and family relationships, the rise of fatherless families, 
and the lack of male role models for young people. The report stated:
We reject the comfortable mantra that policy can or 
should be wholly morally neutral on the grounds that this 
is unworkable in practice.… The failure to form a durable 
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bond between a mother and father often leads to welfare 
dependency. This report makes clear the extent to which 
families su!er financially after family breakdown.… Family 
breakdown is both contributor to and a consequence of 
poverty and most other social problems. (CSJ, 2006, pp 
29–32)
In e!ect, Iain Duncan Smith reverted to a traditional Conservative 
moral underclass discourse that attributed poverty and unemployment 
to essentially individual and moral failings. Poverty and unemployment 
were portrayed as being caused by individual behaviour, such as 
alcohol and drug addiction, chaotic lifestyles, and a lack of purpose 
(dissolution). The structural causes of poverty, such as a lack of available 
jobs in the aftermath of the recession, tended to be overlooked or 
marginalised. Moral arguments regarding an intergenerational culture 
of worklessness were also embraced with a renewed vigour, as pointed 
out by Shildrick et al (2012, p 9).
New paternalism approaches based on the close supervision of 
benefit recipients (Mead, 1997 [[citation not referenced, but 
see et al. Please add/correct]]; MacGregor, 1999) also played an 
important role in government thinking. The Secretary of State for 
Work and Pensions spelled out a vision almost exclusively centred 
on the individual and the family, with a marked emphasis on the 
need to strengthen family life and stable relationships as the best way 
to provide children with a loving, stable environment. The aim was 
to deliver ‘life change’ because spending on benefits, referred to as a 
‘poverty-plus-a-pound’ approach, which was seen as characterising 
Labour’s antipoverty and social exclusion policies, did not address the 
root cause of the problems, whether it be addiction, low expectations 
or, most importantly, family breakdown. At the heart of Iain Duncan 
Smith’s vision is a system of monitoring individual behaviour as early 
as possible in the life cycle:
This must be based on prevention throughout someone’s 
life, intervening early to tackle the root causes of problems 
before they arise rather than waiting to treat the symptoms. 
That starts with the family, the most important building 
block in a child’s life. When families are strong and stable, 
so are children. (Duncan Smith, 2012)
In general, the Conservative-led coalition government used divide-
and-rule rhetoric, along the lines of the hard-working majority versus 
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the minority living on welfare benefits, in order to justify both tougher 
benefit sanctions and the expansion of workfare schemes. Although the 
divide between the deserving and the undeserving poor is a classical 
theme in the history of social security, especially in the field of social 
assistance and unemployment benefits (Deacon, 1976), ministers 
devised a new theme around the idea of ‘fairness to the taxpayer’. 
This narrative has been at the heart of the Conservative Party rhetoric 
on the unemployed and social security since the 1980s. For instance, 
in 1987, the Conservative Secretary of State for Social Security, John 
Moore, justified targeting social spending on those in greatest needs 
in these terms:
The indiscriminate handing out of benefits not only spreads 
limited resources too thinly, it can also undermine the will 
to self-help, and builds pools of resentment among the 
taxpayers who are footing the bill, often from incomes 
barely larger from the money benefit recipients receive. By 
targeting our welfare resources we will be able to provide 
more real help where need is greatest. (Moore, 1987, cited 
by King, 1995, p 180).
In particular, under the coalition, the notion that the ‘taxpayer’ directly 
pays jobseekers to look for employment and accept job o!ers was 
consistently used as a powerful rhetorical device to justify tougher 
benefit sanctions, as spelled out by Iain Duncan Smith in May 2010:
The Job Seeker’s Allowance has a sanction at present. It just 
has not been used. If you simply are not going to play ball, 
then the taxpayer has a right to say: ‘You need to know 
there is a limit to the amount of support we are going to 
give you’. The sanction comes into play. (Duncan Smith, 
2010 [[citation not referenced. Please add/correct/
delete year]], quoted by Wintour, 2010)
One of the fundamental tenets of the Conservative-led welfare-to-work 
programme was the portrayal of income maintenance as a privilege or 
‘advantage’ ‘unfairly’ enjoyed by claimants to the detriment of those 
who abide by the rules, taxpayers and full-time workers who are not 
being helped with living costs. This representation of life on welfare 
as a lifestyle choice fundamentally di!erent from the life of the general 
population represented the main moral justification for implementing 
a much stricter benefit sanction regime. This narrative had no real 
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equivalent under the previous Labour governments. Conservative 
ministers advocated the implementation of a conditionality regime 
that strictly mirrored ‘life in the real world’, especially employment 
contracts. In particular, ministers held that people on welfare should 
be subjected to exactly the same requirements and conditions as those 
who were in full-time work by spelling out that individuals should 
spend up to 35 hours a week looking for work because 35 hours a 
week is the average working week in the UK.
The coalition enjoyed widespread public support in relation to its 
welfare-to-work policies, especially the benefit cap and the stricter 
conditionality regime backed by tougher financial sanctions. These 
policies were supported by the electorate, as measured by public 
attitude surveys and focus groups. Indeed, public attitudes towards 
the unemployed have considerably hardened, with most people now 
‘firmly believing that JSA claimants could get a job if they really wanted 
one’ (Deeming, 2014, p 18; although see also Chapter Three). In this 
context, the coalition was able to portray harsher benefit sanctions as 
essentially ‘fair’.
Conclusion
To conclude, what emerges under the WP and the escalating 
sanctions regime is the image of an authoritarian workfare state that 
delegates much of its sanctioning powers to contracted-out welfare-
to-work providers, while, at the same time, eroding some of the 
support services that are at the heart of active labour market policies. 
Welfare beneficiaries are being subjected to increased monitoring and 
surveillance in what appears to be an unbalanced welfare contract. As 
MacLeavy (2011, pp 362–3) observes:
The allotment of state resources to encouraging work 
through these programmes serves to discipline citizens in 
politically and economically expedient ways.… Austerity, 
in this sense, provides a means of legitimating the coalition 
government’s arrangements to expand programmes to 
orientate state assistance towards work, which increases 
levels of state control over welfare recipients’ lives, at the 
same time as dampening public expectations regarding 
citizenship entitlements.
Taken together, the cumulative impact of the reforms – benefit caps, 
higher benefit sanctions, changes in benefit rules and conditions of 
page 216
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
217
entitlement, accelerated migration of IB claimants onto ESA through 
the WCA, and additional requirements for benefit claimants – 
corresponds to a recasting of the UK’s welfare state, with an erosion 
in terms of substantive social rights, both through statutes, regulations 
and policy implementation.
The record so far of the Conservative government post-2015 suggests 
that the Liberal Democrats did exert a moderating influence on their 
coalition partners in relation to workfare policies for young people 
and cuts to tax credits and disability benefits. The Conservative Party 
manifesto of 2015 singled out young people aged 18–21 for stronger 
work requirements, with the suppression of JSA and the introduction 
of a time-limited (six months) youth allowance, ‘after which young 
people will have to take an apprenticeship, a traineeship or do daily 
community work for their benefits’, the justification for which is 
framed in terms of ‘fairness to the taxpayer’, so that ‘it is not fair – on 
taxpayers, or on young people themselves – that 18–21 year-olds with 
no work experience should slip straight into a life on benefits without 
first contributing to their community’ (Conservative Party, 2015, p 
18). During the coalition government, the Liberal Democrats had 
opposed ending Housing Benefit for young people, which had been a 
key objective of the Prime Minister between 2010 and 2015. Indeed, 
cuts to social security payments for young unemployed people have 
been one of the key ideological characteristics of Conservative Party’s 
social policies since the 1980s. As in the 1980s, Conservative policy 
post-2015 aims to deliberately prolong the dependence of the young 
unemployed on their families (Harris, 1988, p 518). In July 2015, the 
Conservatives’ Budget stated that:
To prevent young people slipping straight into a life on 
benefits, from April 2017 the Budget will also remove the 
automatic entitlement to housing support for new claims 
in Universal Credit from 18–21 year olds who are out of 
work. This will ensure young people in the benefits system 
face the same choices as young people who work and who 
may not be able to a!ord to leave home. (HM Treasury, 
2015, p 41)
Other measures announced in the summer 2015 Budget included 
cutting the rate of ESA for new claimants in the WRAG to the lower 
JSA rate in order to promote full employment (the objective is to 
remove any financial incentive to claim sickness benefits over JSA), 
cuts to tax credits through reducing the level of earnings at which 
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a household’s tax credits and Universal Credit award starts to be 
withdrawn for every extra pound earned, and removing tax credits for 
non-disabled claimants without children (HM Treasury, 2015, p 37).
The Conservative government post-May 2015 has therefore resumed 
with renewed fervour a policy of residual welfarism (Wintour, 2015 
[[citation not referenced, but see 2010. Please add/correct]]). 
The announcement of a ‘National Living Wage’ is likely to only 
partially o!set the cuts to tax credits in a radical departure from the 
previous Labour administrations’ approach to making work pay through 
generous in-work benefits.
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